Emerging school-level education policy under National 2008-9 by Thrupp, Martin
  30
Emerging school-level education 
policy under National 2008-9 
MARTIN THRUPP 
Abstract  
This article discusses school level education policy developments over 2009, 
during National’s first year in office. National was elected amidst a growing 
sense of recession and quickly made cuts to a range of programmes, claiming 
these were necessary to rein in government spending. However there was a 
hollow ring to these claims given the nature of what was cut and given new 
spending on private schools. A stronger privatisation agenda was signalled in 
other areas as well and in its first year National also introduced National 
Standards, a nationwide form of assessment for primary and intermediate 
school children. This article discusses these developments and their contestation 
by some in the sector. It concludes that if the contested ideology of neo-
liberalism comes to further dominate New Zealand education policy in the next 
few years, research could have an important role to play in providing some light 
amidst the heat of reform. However, New Zealand’s capacity to undertake 
research into the impact of education policy is becoming quite limited. This is 
making it increasingly important to tap into academic analyses of neo-liberal 
policies in other national settings where research and scholarship is often better 
funded and more able to be searching than its New Zealand counterpart. 
Introduction  
his article reviews key developments in school-level education 
policy during National’s first year in government, November 
2008 to November 2009.1 The new government, led by John 
Key, could be predicted to bring a neo-liberal emphasis to education 
policy for at least three reasons. First, there was National’s previous 
record in education in the 1990s which had seen bulk-funding of 
teacher salaries, less regulated school enrolment policies, and a heavy 
emphasis on external accountability through the Education Review 
Office (see Thrupp, 1999). Second, although the intervening nine 
years of Labour administration had involved some turning away from 
neo-liberalism, this had been limited. A recent collection of papers on 
education policy over the last decade illustrates that under Helen Clark 
T
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Labour did not so much undo the neoliberal project in New Zealand 
education as take some of the rough edges off it: producing neo-
liberalism with a social conscience (Thrupp & Irwin, 2010).2 Third, 
National also now had two new support parties to keep on side, one of 
which – ACT – was clearly neo-liberal. The same could not be said of 
the Māori Party; however, since Māori political interests do not 
readily line up along a left/right axis, the potential for alignment 
turned out to be greater than perhaps was first apparent. ‘Choice’ 
policies had in some ways worked for Māori in the 1990s, allowing 
the establishment of kura kaupapa Māori as an alternative form of 
Māori education. The election manifesto of the Māori Party, although 
not overtly neo-liberal, included elements which could chime with a 
neo-liberal emphasis on educational choice and competition.3  
Despite all this, it was uncertain to what extent National would 
return to the agenda of the 1990s. National’s politics and politicians 
had clearly shifted somewhat during the Labour interregnum. As well, 
whereas Labour had ruled during a period of prosperity and was able to 
increase its funding of Vote Education by 80% (Office of Hon. Chris 
Carter, 2008), National was elected amidst a growing sense of national 
and global recession. On the face of it, a government of any stripe 
would have faced some tough decisions in education following the 
election, and certainly a feature of National’s first year was some 
significant cuts to professional development and school staffing 
budgets which were explained as necessary to rein in government 
finances. Yet National undertook new spending in education as well. It 
is necessary to look at the detail of both the cuts and the new spending 
to assess what they represent. Finally it would often be unrealistic in 
any case to assume a very obvious correspondence between political 
ideology and policy. As Levin (2001) points out, policymaking is more 
contingent and ambiguous than this: “political decisions are shaped by 
many considerations, including the requirements of staying in office 
and the vicissitudes of the moment as well as the beliefs and 
commitments of policymakers and their advisors” (p. 22). Indeed, Ball 
(1998) describes national policy making as: 
…inevitably a process of bricolage: a matter of borrowing and copying bits and 
pieces of ideas from elsewhere, drawing upon and amending locally tried and 
tested approaches, cannibalising theories, research, trends and fashions and not 
infrequently flailing around for anything at all that looks as though it might 
work. (p. 126) 
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Taking all the above into account, this article critically reviews the 
school-level education policy developments in National’s first year 
and notes a decline in consensus in the educational sector as it 
contested some of the new directions. The introduction of ‘National 
Standards’, a nationwide form of assessment for primary and 
intermediate school children, was the most important initiative 
launched over this period, bringing new performative pressures in 
primary education. There were also new moves towards privatisation 
and a significant extension of the Te Kotahitanga programme. 
Privatisation is clearly a neo-liberal aspiration but what National’s 
support for Te Kotahitanga represents is not so clear-cut. The article 
concludes that National’s first year did move education policy in a 
more clearly neo-liberal direction and made school level education 
policy in New Zealand more contested than it had been for a decade. It 
is suggested that given this context, it is becoming increasingly 
important to tap into academic analyses of neo-liberal policy in other 
national settings where research and scholarship are often able to be 
more searching than in New Zealand.  
The election and its aftermath  
Both National and Labour only released their full school sector 
education policies the week before the election on 8 November 
2008.The response from the sector was that they were short on detail 
(“Nuts and bolts”, 2008). Gerritsen (2008) characterised the policies 
as offering only “a handful of simple choices for education minded 
voters: “increased funding for private schools or not and a move 
towards national testing of primary school children or not” (p. 1). 
After the election, Anne Tolley became Minister of Education, 
Minister responsible for ERO (Education Review Office), and 
Minister for Tertiary Education. The Confidence and Supply 
agreements National signed with the ACT Party and the Māori Party 
were reflected in ACT MP Heather Roy and Māori Party MP Peter 
Sharples both becoming Associate Ministers of Education. National’s 
agreement with ACT made some concessions to ACT’s educational 
choice agenda (discussed further below) but the Māori Party’s 
agreement with National did not go into specific policies in the area of 
education.  
One of the first actions of the new Government was to remove a 
clause in the National Administration Guideline 5 requiring healthy 
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food to be sold on school premises. National also quickly threw out a 
bill before the House, the Education Amendment Bill (no 3) which 
was legislation Labour would have used as part of its ‘Schools Plus’ 
initiative to prevent 15 year-olds from leaving school. Both actions 
symbolised a determination to end what was seen as Labour’s 
‘nannying’ over-intervention in schools. Indeed, Tolley described the 
‘Schools Plus’ policy as reflecting “a socialist reaching out to claw 
back control from schools and communities and to put in place central 
control over how our schools are run” (quoted in Harris, 2008, p. 1). 
In the case of the healthy food clause, the Minister’s justification was 
that “[t]his government trusts Boards of Trustees who are, after all, 
parents of the children who are attending the schools, to make sensible 
decisions and responsible decisions, about the types of food which are 
served to their children, at their schools” (Tolley, 2009). The extent to 
which National was determined to chart a new direction at any cost 
was later highlighted when Tolley admitted in Parliament (29 April 
2009) that she had removed the healthy food clause against the advice 
of her own officials and without seeking any advice from Ministry of 
Health officials. 
Private schools and privatisation 
It was apparent before the election that National would be offering 
more support for private schools (“Key plans”, 2007). This support, 
along with a limited number of scholarships to private schools for 
children from low income families, came to pass during National’s 
first year which was also marked by debate over the integration of 
private schools into the state system. 
The 2009 budget allocated an extra $35million over four years to 
independent schools, whose subsidy from the state had been frozen at 
$42 million since 2000. This was a controversial development given 
the recessionary context. For instance Peter Gall, President of the 
Secondary Principals’ Association, was quoted as saying that some 
excellent programmes had been cut in the state sector while private 
schools benefited (Hartevelt, 2009a). Minto (2009a) pointed out that 
independent schools educate fewer than 4 per cent of children but 
gained $35 million in additional funding, whereas the other 96 per 
cent in state schools received just $320 million extra in the Budget: “A 
simple bit of maths shows the Budget delivered around three times the 
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amount of additional funding to private schools compared with public 
schools”. 
Tolley was unwilling to be drawn on why the funding for 
independent schools had gone ahead when other promises had been 
shelved because of the recession (“Government accused”, 2009). 
Nevertheless a number of arguments were employed to justify it. 
Prime Minister John Key argued that the cap on independent school 
funding had pushed up fees and made these schools increasingly elitist 
so that an increase in funding would help make independent schools 
more affordable for many struggling parents (“Key plans”, 2007). On 
the other hand Harris (2008b) found independent school leaders 
saying that Labour’s funding cap in 2000 meant that the extra funding 
would all be needed for just running their schools, rather than 
allowing any reduction in school fees. More ideological arguments 
were employed by Heather Roy (2009) when, addressing the CEOs of 
independent schools, she suggested that “parents who send their 
children to an independent school are helping to alleviate the burden 
on the State education system” and that “parents of [independent 
school] pupils pay for their children's education twice: once through 
their taxes, and again when they cover the cost of choosing the right 
school for their child”.  
Roy’s (2009) arguments were made in the context of independent 
school bids for integration, another issue that came to the fore in 2009 
as the recession made it more difficult for parents to afford to pay 
independent school fees and their rolls were expected to decline 
(Pepperell, 2009; Smith, 2009a). These pressures led some 
independent schools to bid for integration, in some cases with serious 
intent, others probably only as a means of drawing attention to their 
financial problems. In March, the headmaster of Wanganui Collegiate, 
Tim Wilbur, told Radio New Zealand that he had written to the 
government to ask about the possibility of Wanganui Collegiate 
becoming an integrated school because of fears for its financial 
viability. However, this action was criticised by the Post-Primary 
Teachers’ Association as taking funding away from struggling state 
schools (“Govt should not bail out”, 2009). This in turn led Roy to 
present the arguments above. However, Minto (2009b) responded that 
actually it was parents whose children attend state schools who were 
paying twice, not those attending independent schools: “Once through 
taxes for their children’s local school and then secondly to pay for 
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private and some integrated schools to maintain their socially or 
religiously-cleansed environments for the children of the wealthy”. He 
further argued that the problem with independent schools integrating 
lay in the fact that they did not have to give up their exclusivity:  
A private school which integrates with the public school system has its teacher 
salaries and day to day operating expenses paid by the government but it retains 
ownership of the school land and buildings and retains its “special character”. In 
theory the school largely trades its right to charge private school fees and its 
right to pick and choose students for government payment of everything except 
the upkeep of school buildings and new building developments. In practice 
however many integrated schools have maintained their exclusivity by charging 
many thousands of dollars in building levies so that unlike state schools they are 
not open to enrolment by anyone but wealthy families able to pay. They 
essentially remain private schools but with full government funding for day-to-
day operations. (Minto, 2009b)4  
Independent schools received further support with the 
announcement in September 2009 of ‘Aspire’ scholarships to provide 
children from lower income families an ‘enhanced educational 
opportunity’ by attending private schools, The scholarships would be 
for families with an annual income of $65,000 or less, and a combined 
net worth of less than $150,000. Up to $15,000 per year in fees and 
$1,500 in course costs will be paid. There would be 150 places 
available in 2010 rising to 250 per year by 2012. Gordon (2009a) 
noted the similarities of the Aspire scholarships to the Targeted 
Individual Entitlement scheme run by National in the 1990s and that 
there had been a number of serious problems with that scheme (see 
also Smith & Gaffney, 1997). For example, Smith and Gaffney found 
that students had been teased or bullied, families faced financial 
hardship trying to provide for non-funded activities, only one child per 
family could attend so younger siblings were precluded from also 
attending (thereby generating family tensions), and since few private 
schools participated in the scheme then parental choice was very 
limited anyway. The Aspire scheme looked likely to be beset with 
many of the same problems. Again, the number of places offered to 
the ‘deserving poor’ were very few (and, slightly unexpectedly, 
determined by ballot if oversubscribed), there were areas which are 
not served by private schools so boarding would often be necessary 
(no private secondary schools in Otago or Southland for instance, see 
Lewis, 2009), and none of the Māori boarding schools were included 
as they are not private schools.  
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Another move towards privatisation had been signalled prior to the 
election when it was reported that National was considering using 
private developers to build and own state schools (Trevett, 2007). 
Public-private partnerships came a step closer in July 2009 when it 
was announced that the New Zealand Superannuation Fund had put up 
to $100 million into a public-private partnership (PPP) fund investing 
in New Zealand infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and housing. 
The Public Infrastructure Partnership fund was being set up by 
privately-owned infrastructure manager Morrison & Co (“Public-
private infrastructure”, 2009); the facilities would be handed back to 
public ownership after “two to three decades” of charging an annual 
fee. It was reported in September that the fund would start with up to 
$500 million but was eventually intended to stand at $1-1.5 billion 
(Gibson, 2009). Gibson reported property director Peter Coman saying 
that education facilities were a top priority: “The focus will be on 
education, corrections, health, transport-related infrastructure, defence 
force accommodation, local government water infrastructure and 
community facilities". Coman also described the New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund as the ‘key investor’ which was significant 
given heavy government sponsorship of public private partners in 
other policy settings, e.g., the UK. The scheme would work as 
follows:  
The need for a new prison or school would result in a project company being 
established. The Government would pay that company for delivering the 
building. No payments would be made until the school or prison was finished. 
The fund's role would be to select contractors to design, build and maintain the 
school or prison which would then be transferred to the Government. (Gibson, 
2009) 
Public private partnerships for New Zealand have been criticised, 
drawing on international experience (e.g., Rudman, 2008), and for 
New Zealand education more specifically (Hunt, 2009). Nevertheless, 
National is clearly keen on PPPs (“Public Private Partnerships”, 2009) 
and there is also a well-organised business lobby group to promote 
PPPs, the New Zealand Council for Infrastructure Development 
(NZCID). By October 2009, Aorangi, a Christchurch school facing 
closure rather than rebuilding, was being thought of as a potential 
candidate for a PPP with Ngai Tahu as the business partner (Todd, 
2009). 
There were other developments with potential to contribute to 
privatisation during 2009. One was the tabling of an Education 
Emerging school-level education policy under National 2008-9 
 
 
37
Amendment Bill in April that would have allowed ‘body corporates’ to 
step in as Commissioners for ‘failing boards’. While the Minister 
claimed that the intent of the wording was to allow boards from other 
schools to take over ‘failing boards’, it became clear that the ‘body 
corporate’ phrase could be used to allow companies and other 
organisations to be appointed (“Corporations running schools”, 2009). 
Also signalled was a possible return to bulk funding with informal 
discussion about moving guidance counsellors from schools’ staffing 
budgets to their operations budget. This was part of the Ministry of 
Education grappling with how to cut 50m per year from schools’ 
staffing (Hartevelt, 2009b, see also below).  
Finally, there was continuing advocacy work being done by ACT. 
The National-Act Confidence and Supply Agreement (2008), signed 
on 16 November 2008, contained the following statement:  
National has stated that it will "work, over time, to increase the education 
choices available to parents and pupils so families have more freedom to select 
schooling options that best meet the individual needs of their children." ACT 
also favours greater choice and competition in education. In pursuit of these 
goals, National and ACT have agreed to set up an inter-party working group, 
which shall be resourced as necessary to consider and report on policy options 
relating to the funding and regulation of schools that will increase parental 
choice and school autonomy.  
The working party became active but did not report during 
National’s first year. Nevertheless Heather Roy often advocated a 
privatisation agenda which includes more ‘choice’, funding for the 
private sector, deregulation and contracting out (e.g., Roy, 2009). 
What was entirely missing from this advocacy, however, was any 
recognition that education is a positional good. As Gordon (2009b) 
put it, Roy did not acknowledge the problem that in education “the 
choosers are also part of the commodity – that is, schools are 
attractive or not depending primarily on who goes to them” (p. 7). 
 In contrast to all the other activity around privatisation, there was 
relatively little discussion of school zoning in relation to choice. By 
April 2009, Auckland’s most sought-after state schools were lobbying 
the government to bring in the policy of allowing them to accept the 
children of former students who live outside their zone (Smith, 
2009b), and some commentators were using the opportunity to express 
their support for a revision. A New Zealand Herald editorial suggested 
that National voters couldn’t expect both the assurance of typically 
being ‘in zone’ and an extensive relaxation of zoning. It argued that 
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while electoral pressures would probably scupper any plans to 
extensively relax the zoning laws, National should be supporting the 
principle of choice and the market competition between schools it 
would create (“Principle must triumph”, 2009). Another Herald 
columnist expressed concern that ‘selection by mortgage’ had had the 
effect of reducing the number of Māori and Pasifika students at 
Auckland Boys’ Grammar (although the period of decline cited was 
since 1993, not just since 2000 when Labour’s zoning laws took 
effect, Roughan, 2009). This concern chimed with the arguments of 
the Maxim Institute, a neo-conservative lobby group which had 
argued that removing zoning would make access to schools fairer for 
low socio-economic families on the assumption that most such 
families would benefit from increased ‘choice’ (Thomas, 2007).  
Funding cuts  
The 2009 Budget released on 28 May 2009 required some trimming of 
Ministry of Education and ERO budgets and wholesale cuts to some 
programmes and initiatives. While the most controversial of these was 
an 80% cut in funding for Adult and Community Education courses, 
there were also some school programmes cut including Education for 
Sustainability (under which the Enviroschools programme was 
funded), the Artists in Schools programme, E-learning fellowships and 
professional development in the areas of gifted and talented and health 
education. Also cut were the contestable Extending High Standards 
across Schools initiative and the Innovations Pool for Students At 
Risk. More ominous, especially against the background of a 
demographic bulge in school populations, was the intention to save 
about $50 million per year or 1.5% per year on teachers’ salaries. By 
September it was revealed that the Government planned to lay off the 
equivalent of 772 full-time teachers, but backed down days before the 
1106 affected schools were to be told. The cuts involved a reversal of 
lower teacher-pupil ratios for new-entrant classes with the 1:15 ratio 
started in 2009 being scrapped and returned to the previous 1:18 
(Hartevelt, 2009c). Nevertheless, the cuts seemed only to be delayed 
as the Ministry looked for other means to trim the school staffing 
budget by $50 million.  
 On the other side of the ledger, there was the new funding for 
private schools already noted, fresh investment in some truancy and 
behaviour initiatives, and schools’ operating budgets were increased 
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by 1.95%. Also particularly noteworthy were the extension of Te 
Kotahitanga, and funding for the introduction of National Standards. 
These latter two developments are discussed further below. 
Te Kotahitanga 
The 2009 budget saw additional funding of almost $20 million over 
four years to allow expansion of the Te Kotahitanga project into 15 
new secondary schools and for the design and delivery of Te 
Kotahitanga-based professional leadership programmes for up to 100 
principals of secondary schools each year. The Te Kotahitanga 
programme began in 2001 and aims to support Māori students in 
regular secondary schools by turning teachers away from ‘deficit’ 
discourses and positionings towards more agentic ones centred on 
classroom relationships. Te Kotahitanga was noteworthy for being 
expanded not only in a time of fiscal restraint but also in advance of a 
three-year evaluation of its impact on the goal of raising Māori student 
achievement. This evaluation had, in turn, followed large claims for 
its impact5 and a critical report commissioned by the PPTA 
(Openshaw, 2007). 
National’s support for Te Kotahitanga, an initiative developed 
under Labour, could be seen as important for its relationship with the 
Māori Party which in its election manifesto (Māori Party, 2008) had 
pledged support for professional development for teachers, 
“particularly in cultural competency. But as the Māori Party is often 
more interested in developing Kaupapa Māori forms of education 
(e.g., “Māori students”, 2010; Sharples, 2010), it is just as likely that 
National’s support for Te Kotahitanga lies in the general political 
malleability of what is essentially a school effectiveness initiative. 
That is, Te Kotahitanga would appeal to any government that wanted 
to put responsibility for student failure on the shoulders of schools and 
teachers. For instance, by strongly dismissing sociological arguments 
about the impact of socio-economic status on Māori achievement as 
“deficit theorizing” (Bishop, Berryman, Tiakiwai & Richardson, 2003, 
p. 95; Bishop, 2005), Te Kotahitanga chimes with the view expressed 
by Anne Tolley that poverty is too often used as an excuse for 
underachievement.6 Indeed there is overt ideological work being done 
here as the project seeks to actively prevent teachers from thinking 
about socio-economic issues through defining sociological 
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perspectives as deficit theories and then requiring teachers to 
“positively and vehemently reject deficit theorising as a means of 
explaining Māori students’ educational achievement levels”.7 Black 
(2008) has described this Te Kotahitanga requirement as a “vaguely 
Orwellian approach – acting as though all the other influences in a 
child’s life do not exist” (p. 14).  
One problem with screening out socio-economic issues is that there 
is evidence that low decile schools make the best progress when they 
fully acknowledge and respond to the cultural backgrounds from 
which their students come (Smyth & McInerney, 2007). Culture is of 
course not just a matter of ethnicity, it also has social class dimensions 
and to highlight the former and seek to ignore the latter is 
counterproductive. Telling teachers they must ignore socioeconomic 
issues also removes any resort to the contextual claim that they 
otherwise might fall back on when faced by the politics of blame. For 
instance in a situation where a government agency is unfavourably 
comparing the performance of schools dominated by low-
socioeconomic students with more middle class schools, the teachers 
in the former would be unable to reject culpability for student failure 
even where this culpability was patently unrealistic. Hence the 
paradox of Te Kotahitanga is that its enthusiasm for the power of 
teaching could help to support a situation where ‘poorly performing’ 
schools are publicly castigated, find it difficult to recruit teachers, and 
could even be shut down. Many of those schools will invariably be 
low-decile schools and many will have large numbers of Māori 
students. To the extent that teachers serve communities, including 
remote and disadvantaged communities, support for the politics of 
blame can be expected to have wider consequences than for teachers 
alone. 
National Standards  
On 13 December 2008 the Education (National Standards) Amendment 
Bill was passed. The National Party had long argued for more testing in 
schools, having raised proposals for national testing in 1997, 1999 and 
2005. In April 2007 the then Opposition Leader, John Key,  announced 
the intention to introduce National Standards tied to expected levels of 
achievement for all students by the end of each of Years 1-8 in 
mathematics, reading and writing. National Standards are not measured 
by a single high-stake test as is the typical of national testing in other 
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countries. Rather, they are standards against which a range of tests, 
including those previously used for formative achievement, can be 
benchmarked. The shift from National testing to National Standards 
seems to have been a response to advice from University of Auckland 
academic Professor John Hattie and perhaps also in anticipation of 
opposition to national testing from the school sector. However, the 
difference was not enough to prevent growing concern amongst 
primary teachers, principals and others that National Standards would 
lead to league tables, an increasingly narrow curriculum, and the 
various other perverse consequences for schools and students 
evidenced under national testing regimes elsewhere (Thrupp & Hursh, 
2006).  
The reluctance of the Minister to provide clear reasons for 
introducing National Standards or to acknowledge possible problems 
with them did little to allay such concern. There was an obvious 
mismatch between National Standards for all New Zealand children 
and the claim that National Standards were most needed to address the 
problem of the 20% of children, especially Māori and Pasifika, who 
made up New Zealand's so-called 'long tail of underachievement' as 
the latter would imply a more targeted approach. Some of the 
Minister’s statements suggested the Government was operating with 
simplistic notions of poorly performing teachers needing to be made 
more accountable. The Minister also dismissed arguments based on 
the experience of national testing in other countries on the grounds 
that National Standards would allow for a range of tests rather than a 
single one. She offered few assurances about the way the National 
Standards would be used by government or the media. Indeed, until 
the opposition to national standards became too obvious to ignore, 
Tolley argued that the sector was largely supportive. This stance 
ignored well-publicised research evidence to the contrary provided as 
early as October 2008 (Schagen & Hipkins, 2008). 
Further concerns revolved around how National Standards were 
being implemented at speed and without effective consultation. The 
13 December Bill had been passed under urgency, allowing it to 
bypass the Education and Science Select Committee where the merits 
of National Standards could have been debated. The formal 
consultation period from 18 May to 3 July saw meetings in the regions 
as well as main centres and there was the opportunity to make 
submissions with almost 5000 of these analysed and reported by 
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researchers at NZCER. There were two problems with the 
consultation. The first was that both the consultation meetings and the 
forms provided for making submissions structured the responses to be 
about the draft National Standards provided, not more broadly about 
the concept of national standards or whether New Zealand needed 
them. As one correspondent to the Dominion Post complained:  
This government hasn’t played by the rules of our democratic society. The 
parent consultation, which I attended, stated quite simply that National 
Standards were coming because the government had already changed the law. 
Now do you want the Plunket graph [approach to reporting achievement results] 
or the other one? Sir Humphrey Appleby (of Yes Minister fame) would have 
been proud of this government and its consultation processes.8  
A second problem involved the political spin put around the 
findings of the consultation. Repeating the pattern of not 
acknowledging concerns about National Standards, a press release 
from Minister Tolley’s office on 20 September claimed that 
“Consultation feedback shows strong support from parents for 
National Standards” (“Parents support National Standards”, 2009). In 
fact the report analysing consultation feedback showed considerable 
diffidence amongst parents with 38% of parents making negative 
comments about the National Standards system and only 14% making 
positive comments (Wylie, Hodgen & Darr, 2009).  
The consultation, such as it was, did little to dampen the concerns 
of the sector; indeed, it was towards the end of the consultation period 
that the NZEI (New Zealand Education Institute) and NZPF (New 
Zealand Principals’ Federation), having consulted extensively with 
their members, firmed up their opposition to National Standards and 
more particularly their potential for league tables. In the case of the 
NZEI this was done at the end of June through a press release which 
called on government to push out the timeline and said schools would 
actively oppose any centralised reporting of the standards data (Anger 
over National Standards consultation, NZEI, 2009). In early July the 
NZPF conference was used as a platform to voice primary principals’ 
opposition to National Standards as well (Buutveld, 2009). 
These stances triggered a media response that was vociferous by 
New Zealand standards, being more comparable to the attacks on 
teachers in England during the 1980s than anything New Zealand had 
experienced previously. Daily newspaper editors and commentators 
across the country accused teachers of refusing to be accountable with 
little support for their concerns.9 While the arguments were often ill-
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informed (e.g., “Better to make it plain”, 2009), they had the effect of 
removing any sense of public support for the concerns of teachers and 
principals. A fresh burst of media indignation in September 
surrounded the case of Paul Heffernan, a primary principal who had 
written a tongue-in-cheek account of how he would play to win under 
National Standards.10 Ironically, this had been done as part of a forum 
on a Ministry of Education website for education leaders after the 
forum was colonised by principals as a space to express their concerns 
about National Standards. Although the Dominion Post asked ‘Why 
has this public servant still got a job?’ (”Listen and learn, teachers”, 
2009), Heffernan’s blog can also be seen as a highly ethical act. It 
highlighted the risks of performativity and demonstrated the power of 
humour in communicating that risk. 
With the support of the media apparently behind it, the 
Government pushed out the timeline for reporting National Standards 
data to 2012 but did not provide any assurances about taking steps to 
prevent the misuse of data. It also announced that advisory services 
for teaching the arts, science and physical education were to be 
withdrawn for 2010 in order to fund support for the introduction of 
National Standards. This provided an immediate, tangible example of 
the curriculum being narrowed and also emphasised that National 
Standards were being introduced frugally11 with an enormous 
assumption of goodwill on the part of primary teachers and principals.  
National Standards were launched on 23 October, the day before 
Labour weekend.  
While Prime Minister John Key called the plan “one of the most 
important steps” his Government would ever take (Dye, 2009), the 
NZEI and NZPF were conspicuous by their absence and the NZEI 
announced its intention to hold its own forum on the standards. PPTA 
also used the event to criticise National Standards (“National 
standards threaten NCEA”, 2009). Media coverage of the event also 
saw the first editorial supporting teachers in their stance against 
National Standards (“Let teachers teach”, 2009) and the following 
week a national lobby group called ‘Parents against Labelling’ had 
formed.  
By the end of its first year, National Standards were the most 
obvious area of education where National looked most politically 
exposed by so little enthusiasm within the sector, growing public 
concern that the teachers might have a reason for their views, and a 
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conservative but ever fickle media. National was attempting to 
persuade teachers and principals rather than risk serious confrontation 
with them. Its hand was unwittingly shown, for instance, in a 
communication proposal that accompanied its scrapped plan to lay off 
teachers which was released under the Official Information Act. This 
noted the risk that “In addition to potentially sending a negative 
message to the sector, reducing staffing may make the sector less 
willing to implement Government priorities, in particular the national 
standards” (Hartevelt, 2009c).  
Conclusion  
National’s first year moved education policy in a clearly neo-liberal 
direction, with greater support for private schools and privatisation 
than in the previous decade and clearer indicators of ‘quality’ through 
the imposition of National Standards. It also saw the reinforcement of 
Te Kotahitanga as a suitable initiative to be supported by National 
despite being developed under Labour. Meanwhile some areas which 
might have been predicted to change, such as TFEA (decile funding), 
were left alone.12 A year after the election, school level education 
policy in New Zealand was already the most contested it had been for 
a decade. 2010 was to see further developments in some of the areas 
discussed. For example, in February the Inter-Party Working Group 
for School Choice recommended a partial voucher system (Inter-Party 
Working Group for School Choice, 2010) while a minority report 
simultaneously released by ACT predictably went further (Act Party, 
2010). In July the government announced that tenders for public 
private partnerships to build schools could be called as early as 2011 
(English & Tolley, 2010). Throughout the year there was a continuing 
standoff over National Standards with varying opposition to the policy 
from the NZEI, New Zealand Principals’ Federation and other groups 
and individuals but few concessions from Government.  
If the contested ideology of neo-liberalism comes to further 
dominate New Zealand education policy in the next few years, 
research could have an important role to play in providing some light 
amidst the heat of reform. However, it needs to be recognised that 
much of the appeal of neo-liberal policy is populist rather than 
evidence-informed. Lubienski (2008) points out that although the 
body of academic research evidence does not support the growth of 
choice programmes in the USA, these continue to grow because 
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choice has increasingly become an ideology supported by advocacy 
groups despite whatever the research ‘says’. Burch (2009, p. 83) 
characterises ideology as being that “markets can succeed where 
government has failed and the role of policy is to cheerlead and 
stimulate demand.” In this context the value of educational research 
may need to be constantly reasserted by New Zealand educators. 
A related problem New Zealand faces is that our national capacity 
to undertake searching research into the impact of education policy is 
becoming quite limited. There are numerous reasons for this including 
the way most New Zealand education research is funded by the 
Ministry of Education rather than having more neutral research 
councils or bodies,13 and the business orientation of New Zealand 
universities increasingly precluding research which is not charged out 
at full overheads. Salaries for New Zealand academic posts are 
generally less competitive than those offered by universities overseas 
and they tend to involve relatively heavy teaching workloads. The 
way the Performance Based Research Fund requires so many 
‘outputs’, different indicators of ‘peer esteem’ and ‘contributions to 
the research environment’ from New Zealand academics may also not 
be conducive to really in-depth research programmes.  
In such a context it is becoming increasingly important to tap into 
academic analyses of neo-liberal policies in other national settings 
where research and scholarship is often better funded and more able to 
be searching than its New Zealand counterpart. For instance, Ball 
(2007) and Burch (2009) raise carefully researched concerns regarding 
the ‘on the ground’ effects of privatisation. Such work deserves 
careful consideration in the New Zealand/Aotearoa context. Similarly, 
writers such as Alexander (2009), Ball (2003), Gillborn & Youdell 
(2000), Hursh (2008), Nichols & Berliner (2007), Reay & William 
(1999) and Stobart (2008) raise a variety of concerns about the effects 
of performativity on schools and students which are relevant to 
National Standards. While it is true that New Zealand is a distinctive 
arena for policy, there is a balance to be struck between 
acknowledging the importance of this distinctiveness and recognising 
the insights provided by good educational research and scholarship on 
offer elsewhere. New Zealand as a small nation is usually a ‘borrower’ 
rather than a ‘lender’ of education policy. It must be a (discriminating) 
borrower of the accompanying intellectual critiques as well.  
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1  This article is based on the concluding chapter of Thrupp & Irwin (2020). 
2  There was only a limited repudiation of the market which was offset by an increase in 
managerialism in some areas. Labour also created policies that would make it easy for National to 
move policy further to the Right once elected. For instance the Education Standards Bill (2001) 
offered the potential for greater performativity without much legislative change. Contestable 
funding could be easily withdrawn. Heavy emphasis on the quality of teaching set the scene for 
‘the politics of blame’ (Thrupp, 1998) where governments attempt to construct student or 
institutional ‘underperformance’ or ‘failure’ as the clear responsibility of schools and teachers. In 
short, the education policy legacy National was left with would require only incremental change to 
fit a more neo-liberal agenda. 
Emerging school-level education policy under National 2008-9 
 
 
51
                                                                                                                  
3  E.g., “The public needs to be provided with better information on school performance, including Māori 
and Pacific achievement” (Māori Party, 2008). 
4  Integrated schools also came under further public scrutiny later in the year when Rathkeale College 
suggested a parent mortgage her home in order to pay a large school ‘donation’ when she insisted 
she couldn’t pay. The subsequent debate over whether the school was being heavy-handed or the 
parent irresponsible ended in the Minister ordering an inquiry and confirming that parents could not 
be required to pay voluntary donations. (“Minister backs mother's stand”, 2009) 
5  For instance Openshaw (2007) notes that it was claimed in a 20/20 documentary screened on TV3 
on 23 April 2007 that Te Kotahitanga was on its way to solving the problem of Māori 
underachievement, and in less than a generation. There was also an earlier claim that “[t]he results 
of this study show that it is feasible within a relatively short period of time, to improve Māori 
students’ educational achievement. The results add to both local and international literature that 
shows that changing how teachers theorise their relationships with Māori students and how they 
interact with them in the classroom can have a major impact upon Māori students’ engagement 
with learning and short term achievement” (Bishop et al., 2003 p. 198). 
6  Comment made on Radio New Zealand ‘Insight’ programme on National Standards, Sunday 26 
April 2008.  
7  This is the first point of Te Kotahitanga’s ‘Effective Teaching Profile’ (Bishop et al., 2003, p. 95).  
8  Letter to Dominion Post editor from Bill Courtney, Chairperson, Khandallah School Board of 
Trustees, 20 October 2009. Tolley would later say about parents: “I don't think they were ever 
asked, put up a show of hands, do you want this or not... We sort of did that at the election. It was a 
key part of our manifesto, so we do have a public mandate” (cited in Woulfe, 2009).  
9  Misa (2009) provided a rare exception. 
10  Heffernan wrote in his blog “Awesome, awesome, awesome – by crickey we are going to teach to 
the easiest test we can find. We are going to reteach and reteach baby. We will even fudge the 
results big time. My school is going to be top school on the league table so that my community will 
know I run a brilliant school – an outstanding principal – parents will flock to my door. To hell 
with anything creative. Hmmm I will have to toss out Inquiry learning as well as I will not have 
any time – it's all literacy and numeracy test preparation time now. Hmmm, perhaps I need a 
further run through /practice of the test. And don't say that this will not happen – it sure did with 
NCEA. League Tables will be here to stay. At the consultation meeting in Auckland it was 
commented by the presenters that yes indeed the media would have access to the results – can't stop 
them. Hell, test results have to be in soon – better have another run through. But wait maybe, 
maybe if my results are a tad below expected they will give me some more funding. Way below, 
more funds yippy do, and that new zappy do computer link up with Uranus will be a goer!!!!”  
11  The budget allocated $36 million over 4 years for this nation-wide reform.  
12  One exception was that annual grant for secondary school sports would be withdrawn and allocated 
on a non-decile basis, such that low decile schools would lose funds while wealthier schools gain 
(Laxon, 2009).  
13  The Marsden fund is one exception but funds only a small percentage of New Zealand’s 
educational research.  
